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The general theme of coping with financial austerity
has been very much visible in thinking about the
future of both welfare state and (public) higher edu-
cation, and it has often been accompanied by its twin
theme in thinking about the future of social services,
namely privatisation. The tight fiscal environment
for both the welfare state in general and for higher
education in particular continues, and in many coun-
tries is even bound to intensify (as Paul Pierson has
entitled his influential paper, we face “coping with
permanent austerity”, 2001a). In European transition
countries, the solutions suggested to higher educa-
tion systems increasingly include references to such
notions as academic entrepreneurialism (in both tea-
ching, research, and third mission activities), finan-
cial self-reliance of academic institutions, and cost-
sharing (the introduction, or increasing, tuition fees,
smaller state subsidies, more student land and less
scholarships etc, see Kwiek 2006a, 2006d, 2007a).
What is suggested is also bigger workloads for aca-
demics and bigger classes for students, contracts for
faculty instead of tenure etc. As an EU policy paper
influential among policy-makers concludes,
After remaining a comparatively isolated universe
for a very long period, both in relation to society and
to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and
a status protected by respect for their autonomy,
European universities have gone through the second
half of the 20th-century without really calling into
question the role or the nature of what they should be
contributing to society (EC 2003b: 22, emphases
mine).
So higher education is no longer isolated from the
society and, especially, the economy, its (especially
research) funding is no longer guaranteed and its
missions are under scrutiny. The solutions suggested
are both cost-side and revenue-side, strongly relating
the future of public higher education to current
financial austerity. Consequently, university mis-
sions are being renegotiated, either in theory or in
practice (or both), new economic contexts of public
universities are increasingly important, following
renewed interest in higher education, and new con-
cepts in rethinking higher education are being coined
by international and supranational organizations
(such as the World Bank or OECD). There is clear
convergence of economic and academic spaces in
thinking about reforming higher education in Europe
(the best exemplification being the subsumption of
the Bologna Process under the overall EU Lisbon
strategy of more growth/more jobs while creating
the most competitive economy in the world, see
Kwiek 2004b). Various European countries (and
especially transition countries) have been experi-
menting with the privatisation of various segments
of the welfare state, including higher education,
healthcare and pension systems. Transformations to
higher education are linked here to transformations
of the welfare state – which, in turn, are linked to
more global economic, social, and political proces-
ses. All segments of welfare state seem to be “over-
burdened” today, and operate under increasing finan-
cial pressures. Because of changing European demo-
graphics and aging of European societies, the costs
of both healthcare and pensions are very high; the
costs of research are escalating, and the participation
rates in higher education has never been as high as
today (although they seem to be stabilizing in many
countries on current, very high, levels). Amidst
financial austerity, the competition for public funds
has been growing. Higher inflow of private funds –
both to research and development, to higher educa-
tion through fees, to pension systems through multi-
pillar systems instead of pay-as-you-go ones, and to
healthcare through semi-privatisation and private
insurance – to the welfare systems in general is hap-
pening right before our eyes. Perhaps especially, but
not inclusively, in the European transition econo-
mies.
Social scientists seem to agree that we are facing the
end of the welfare state as we know it. There does
not seem to be a major disagreement, broadly spea-
king, about the future of the welfare state in its cur-
rent European postwar form: its foundations, for a
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variety of internal and external reasons and due to a
variety of international and domestic pressures, need
to be renegotiated today. Welfare retrenchment has
come to be seen as necessary by the governments of
most affluent Western democracies, international
organizations (such as the OECD), global organiza-
tions and development agencies (such as the World
Bank) and the European Commission2. 
In general, we are experiencing, in different Europe-
an countries to different degrees, the following phe-
nomena: the increasing privatisation and the shrin-
king of state welfare (which may be compensated for
by private welfare – but with a new distribution of
risks and uncertainties, as discussed by Giuliano
Bonoli, following the Risikogesellschaft line of thin-
king common to such sociologists as Ulrich Beck,
Anthony Giddens or Scott Lash); the reduction in the
number of public sector employees; the end of the
option of developing the welfare state through crea-
ting new public sector jobs (as in Scandinavian
countries), including tenured jobs in higher educa-
tion; generally speaking, taxation and spending
models may be becoming increasingly convergent
(following the idea of “investor-friendly” or “busi-
ness-friendly” climates in particular countries), as
funding policies may become convergent with
respect to higher education (fees and loans); as well
as there being no way to avoid a “globally accepted”
downward trend in funding public services in gene-
ral and a global trend which favors the market rather
than the state in providing public services in general. 
So the prospects for the future seem to be that higher
education will be increasingly seen as part of the
public sector, with its traditional uniqueness lost,
with all consequences of this loss. One way to break
away from this perspective is to view higher educa-
tion as an investment, rather than a burden, which is
crucial for the development of “knowledge-based”
societies and economies or to view higher education
through the lens of social capital formation. Martin
Carnoy sounds moderately optimistic when he con-
cludes in his book about globalization and educatio-
nal reforms that his analysis suggests that a major
“real” impact of globalization is to change the role of
nation-states. Nation-states are becoming limited as
direct economic actors and, as a result, are losing
political legitimacy. But at the same time, nation-sta-
tes, and regional and local governments, will depend
increasingly for their legitimacy on their ability to
create the conditions for economic and social deve-
lopment. In the new global economy, these condi-
tions will depend increasingly on the way the state
organizes the education system. Because knowledge
is the most highly valued commodity in the global
economy, nations have little choice but to increase
their investment in education (Carnoy 1999: 82,
emphases mine). 
The question is whether he means public or private
investments. The OECD trends show that the share
of private funding in both research funding and edu-
cation funding has been growing constantly, and at a
much higher rate than public funding (in the case of
transition countries – especially in the form of tui-
tion fees in both public and private sectors). It is
interesting to contrast his arguments with Gøsta
Esping-Andersen’s arguments against increasing
investments in higher education for knowledge-
based societies (as opposed to massive investments
in children and families with children3). In his view,
a knowledge-intensive economy will lead to a new
social polarization and new social dualisms. The
long-term scenario might very well be “a smattering
of ‘knowledge islands’ in a great sea of marginalized
outsiders”. To avoid this bleak development, cogni-
tive capacities and the resource base of citizens must
be strengthened, through primary and secondary
education. On numerous occasions, he recommends
massive investment in children, and families with
children (e.g. Esping-Andersen 2002: 3). As he
argues, 
The most simple-minded “third way” promoters
believe that the population, via education, can be
adapted to the market economy and that the social
problem will, hence, disappear. This is a dangerous
fallacy. Education, training or life-long learning can-
not be enough. A skill-intensive economy will breed
new inequalities; a full-employment service econo-
my will reinforce these. And if we are unwilling to
accept low-end services, it will be difficult to avoid
widespread unemployment. In any case, education
cannot undo differences in people’s social capital
(Esping-Andersen 2001: 134-35, emphasis mine). 
The claim shared by many economists, sociologists
and welfare analysts is that the limits of public
expenditure and taxation have probably already been
reached in EU-15 member countries. Investment for
the knowledge society is already subject to strong
external constraints. Esping-Andersen rightly men-
tions “the new inequalities and social risks that
knowledge-based economies inevitably provoke”,
“new winners and losers” and a deepening gulf bet-
ween those with and without skills4. He suggests two
ground rules for policy making: one, “we cannot
pursue too one-dimensionally a ‘learning society’, a
human capital-based strategy in the belief that a tide
of education will lift all boats. Such a strategy inevit-
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ably leaves the less-endowed behind”; and two,
“new social policy challenges cannot be met by any
additional taxation or spending as a percent of GDP.
We must accordingly concentrate on how to impro-
ve the status quo” (Esping-Andersen 2001: 146-47).
So the pie will have to be divided up differently. Let
us remember here Harold A. Hovey’s discussion of
competing welfare programs (and welfare programs
competing with other programs such as infrastructu-
re, prisons, police etc) in which higher education has
recently been less successful than other claimants of
government funding. It looks like the whole traditio-
nal post-war slice-cutting of the pie of state funding
may have to be renegotiated in Europe. Former win-
ners may be future losers (and vice versa) in the new
setting of changing (social and other) priorities, gro-
wing inequalities and possibly new ideas regarding
what counts most in our societies and what counts
less, and consequently new ideas on how to cut the
pie differently. We are in a very dynamic situation
right now; it is hard to predict future policy direc-
tions, especially as they may differ considerably
from country to country, or region to region, alt-
hough some desirable policy mix to meet the requi-
rements of a “competitive, employment-friendly and
equitable welfare state” may be defined in advance
(Ferrera et al 2001: 114)5. 
There are very few social scientists discussing the
issue of higher education and the emergent knowled-
ge society, who believe that globalization may actu-
ally encourage increases in spending on higher edu-
cation from the public purse, at the expense of other
programs of the welfare state. One of them is Vito
Tanzi (from the IMF) who in his paper on “Taxation
and the Future of Social Protection” claims that glo-
balization may create pressures for increased spen-
ding for education, training, research and develop-
ment, the environment, infrastructures, and for insti-
tutional changes partly to increase efficiency and
partly to comply with international agreements.
These expenditures are consistent with the traditio-
nal or basic role of the state in its allocation function.
Thus, expenditure for social protection, which is a
newcomer in the role of the state, could be squeezed
between falling revenue and increasing needs for
more traditional types of spending. In such a situa-
tion, the state will need to rethink its role in the eco-
nomy (Tanzi 2001: 196). 
This approach is very rare indeed. Although theore-
tically it is possible to claim increases in the share of
the public funds for national public higher education
systems using the “knowledge-based society” argu-
mentation, in practice it has not worked in any of the
major OECD countries or European transition coun-
tries so far. The situation of increasing financing hig-
her education recalls that of raising taxes for the sake
of raising the standards of welfare provisions: every-
one would like to have better public universities but
only few are willing to pay higher taxes for this rea-
son (compare the generally supportive attitude
towards welfare contrasted with the unwillingness to
be taxed accordingly). The option of more public
funding for higher education or research and deve-
lopment in Europe in the future is explicitly exclu-
ded even by the European Commission6. 
2. The state/market pendulum:
towards state’s changing
responsibilities?
The debate on the future of the (public) university
today comes as part and parcel of a much wider
debate on the future of the public sector (and state
intervention in, or provision of, different, traditional-
ly public, services). Certainly in the period of the tra-
ditional Keynesian welfare state regimes it was the
state – rather than the market – that was deeply
involved in the economy and in the protection of
nation-state citizens against the potential social evils
of postwar capitalism. As the World Bank’s flagship
publication on the role of the state (The State in a
Changing World) argues, for much of the 20th cen-
tury people looked to government or the state to do
more; but since the 1980s, the pendulum has been
swinging again, and the existing conceptions of the
state’s place in the world have been challenged by
such developments as e.g. the collapse of command-
and-control economies or the fiscal crisis of the wel-
fare state. Consequently, today, the countries are
asking again what government’s role ought to be and
how its roles should be played (World Bank 1997:
17). The state’s behavior and the consequences of
that behavior are under severe scrutiny worldwide.
The post-war paradigm of the Keynesian welfare
state (John Gerard Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism
compromise” – a compact between the state and
society to mediate the deleterious domestic effects of
postwar international economic liberalization, see
Ruggie 1982 and 1997) coalesced around three basic
themes. It was the social need to provide welfare
benefits, the desirability of a mixed public-private
economy which would often mean the nationaliza-
tion of a range of strategic national industries, and
finally the need for a coordinated macroeconomic
policy directed toward e.g. full employment (World
Bank 1997: 22). 
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It was in Central and Eastern Europe, exposed to the
influences of global agencies in redefining their
future models of the welfare state and consequently
national welfare policies, that the direct link between
the new “effective” state on the one hand, with a
downsizing of the public sector and a redefined
minimal welfare state, and higher education policies
on the other, was very much visible. Still another
paradox, largely overlooked except for a handful of
Central European social scientists, was that the poli-
cies for the ten accession countries, generally pro-
moted and praised in subsequent accession coun-
tries’ reports by the European Commission, were not
exactly “European” policies rooted in European
models of the welfare state with its generally accep-
ted “European social model”7 ; on the contrary, as
Zsuzsa Ferge convincingly demonstrates (and as
many of us Central Europeans know very well from
policies actually being implemented in the healthca-
re, pensions and other public sectors8), these policies
are largely neoliberal9.That is another reason to take
the link between the welfare state and higher educa-
tion seriously in this part of Europe; it is here that
educational policies, and consequently the future of
public universities, may be going hand in hand with
changing welfare policies, as in the traditional World
Bank formulation of the “third wave of privatisa-
tion” where changes in education follow changes in
the two major claimants on welfare state resources:
healthcare services and public pensions systems (see
Rama 2000; Torres and Mathur 1996). 
To refer to an image used by numerous commenta-
tors – that of a state/market pendulum10: the pendu-
lum had swung from the statist development model
to the “minimalist state” model of the 1980s, epito-
mized by such names as Margaret Thatcher in the
United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the USA.
The countries involved in implementing “New
Public Management” and “reinventing government”
policie11s squeezed programs in education and
health12 but the result of this “overzealous rejection
of government” was, the World Bank admits, the
“neglect of the state’s vital functions, threatening
social welfare and eroding the foundations for mar-
ket development” (World Bank 1997: 24). So, after a
few years, probably for the first time in the World
Development Report of 1997 referred to here, that
the World Bank, heavily involved in implementing
structural adjustment policies in developing coun-
tries, had to admit that the idea of the “minimal
state” did not work13. It is here that the two crucial
passages which show a considerable change in the
Bank’s attitude to the state appear: “Development –
economic, social, and sustainable – without an effec-
tive state is impossible. It is increasingly recognized
that an effective state – not a minimal one – is cen-
tral to economic and social development”, as well as
another passage which argues that “State-dominated
development has failed, but so will stateless deve-
lopment. Development without an effective state is
impossible” (World Bank 1997: 18, 25). Up to World
Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, the
ideal for the World Bank had been the “minimal
state”14. At the same time, for education and health-
care services, the publication introduces a historical
relativization of what can, and what does not neces-
sarily have to, be seen as the state’s responsibility. 
The state is thus viewed by the World Bank not as a
direct provider of growth but a “partner, catalyst, and
facilitator” (World Bank 1997: 1). The state should
certainly be assisting households to cope with cer-
tain risks to their economic security but “the idea
that the state alone must carry this burden is chan-
ging”. Innovative solutions are needed – which is
especially important for those developing countries
which are not yet “locked into costly solutions” (of
the kind provided by the generous Western-style
welfare state, let us add)15. 
Coming back to the picture of the state/market pen-
dulum, citizens (especially from the developing
world) should not look for solutions from the state –
but should focus instead on solutions provided by
the market. The consequences for the public sector,
including higher education, are far-reaching16: “alt-
hough the state still has a central role in ensuring the
provision of basic services – education, health, infra-
structure – it is not obvious that the state must be the
only provider, or a provider at all” (World Bank
1997: 27). An “effective state” can leave some areas
to the market and the areas where markets and pri-
vate spending can meet most needs are “urban hospi-
tals, clinics, universities, and transport” (World Bank
1997: 53). The state should not leave to the market
such public goods as clean air, safe water or basic
literacy but with respect to higher education it is not
obvious that it must be a provider at all… “Choosing
what to do and what not to do is critical”, as the idea
is nicely phrased in a different passage (World Bank
1997: 3). 
New publications on the tertiary education sector in
the World Bank carry different overtones though.
Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges
for Tertiary Education (2002) is very careful in des-
cribing a state’s obligations with respect to higher
education: obligations include working within a
coherent policy framework, providing an enabling
regulatory environment, and working towards finan-
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cial incentives; the state’s role is guidance rather
than steering, and in the elaboration of a clear vision
for the long-term development of the education
system on a national level (World Bank 2002: xxii-
xxiv). Despite diminished fiscal resources and com-
peting claims from other sectors (see Hovey 1999),
governments in the World Bank’s account still have
at least three strong reasons for supporting the sec-
tor: investments in higher education generate exter-
nal benefits essential for economic and social deve-
lopment; capital market imperfections make loans
largely unavailable to students on a large scale, in a
wide range of programs; and finally, higher educa-
tion plays a key role in supporting basic and secon-
dary education (World Bank 2002: 76). The report
does not leave much doubt about the need to ade-
quately finance higher education from the public
purse 
Higher education plays a crucial role in the con-
struction of knowledge societies and the rationale for
the state support of higher education (within clearly
defined limits) is surprisingly strong here. But the
differences between the Bank’s major publications
and its (somehow niche) publications on the educa-
tion sector has to be born in mind. A brief note is
necessary here: there is a tremendous difference bet-
ween the Bank’s writings on the state and related
issues and its writings on higher education. The dif-
ference has been evident from the Bank’s first book
on the education sector published in 1994 (Higher
Education. The Lessons of Experience) to Construc-
ting Knowledge Societies (published in 2002). There
is an interesting incompatibility between the way the
Bank in general views the role of the state vis-à-vis
higher education, and the way the relationship is vie-
wed by its education sector. Consequently, such
flagship publications as subsequent World Develop-
ment Reports are not compatible in their views on
the state/market relationships with most of the books




How is the public funding of education and educa-
tion spending (as part of social expenditure within
the welfare state undergoing restructuring) to be seen
as an investment rather than a cost? Paradoxically,
the unwillingness or inability of the state to increase
the level of public funding for higher education (or
in more general terms, to use Philip G. Cerny’s
expression, the decreased state’s potential for “col-
lective action”17) is accompanied by a clear realiza-
tion that – in the new global era – higher education
is more important for social and economic develop-
ment than ever before. The United Nations’ report on
“globalization and the state” argues that countries
that want to benefit from globalization must invest in
education, to upgrade their citizens’ skills and know-
ledge (United Nations 2001: 84). Martin Carnoy (as
part of his UNESCO explanation of “what planners
need to know” about restructuring higher education
under global pressures) concludes that what is nee-
ded is a coherent and systemic effort by the public
sector – which “usually means more, as well as more
effective, public spending” (Carnoy 1999: 86). There
is thus an interesting tension between what most
education sector specialists and academics dealing
with higher education issues say about the future of
higher education and what political economists,
political scientists or sociologists say about the futu-
re of the state, as well as the welfare state and its ser-
vices in particular, including higher education. There
is no easy way out of this apparent paradox and we
have to stress its significance. Perhaps this is one of
those cracks in the otherwise seamless fabric of glo-
balization accounts regarding the future role of hig-
her education in which some future, unexpected
shifts in the relations between the state and the uni-
versity may take place (Kwiek 2007b). 
An American perspective on the state subsidy of hig-
her education is relatively simple and its simplicity
finds followers in various American and global aid,
lending and development agencies. Even though the
perspective apparently looks restrictive in its scope
for the USA and the developing countries reforming
higher education systems under the aegis of various
US-led development programs, it is very useful to
have a brief look at it (in the context of most coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, most often lak-
king the resources for European models of the wel-
fare state, the exercise of scrutinizing this perspecti-
ve may be even more rewarding28). Harold A. Hovey,
director of the National Center for Public Policy and
Higher Education, takes as a point of departure the
claim that state funding for higher education has
always been heavily influenced by a states’ fiscal
situation: 
changes in state fiscal conditions are often multip-
lied in their impacts on higher education. When
finances are tight, higher education budgets are often
cut disproportionately. When financial conditions
are good, higher education often receives larger
increases than most other programs (Hovey 1999: 1). 
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Consequently, drawing from an American experien-
ce, we can extrapolate the idea to Europe, or at least
Central and Eastern Europe, and say that state fun-
ding for higher education depends on the overall out-
look for state finances. Higher education funding in
the EU-15 and in new EU countries is comparable
but funding for research and development in the lat-
ter is critically low, and increasing slowly or not at
all. The projections for the future suggest that the
tight fiscal environment will continue, if not intensi-
fy, in the coming years. Basically, the situation faced
by governments is that of a zero-sum game: gains in
share by one program (e.g. higher education) have to
come at the expense of other programs, social, infra-
structural and other. Therefore a very important
question, largely overlooked in European discus-
sions, should be raised: 
The underlying question about spending will be
whether, at the margin, higher education spending is
contributing more than spending at the margin in
other programs. This question will be raised in a
political dimension with the adverse electoral conse-
quences of cuts in higher education compared with
cuts affecting public schools, health care providers,
and others active in state politics. The question will
be raised in a substantive dimension with the values
of improvements in higher education compared with
values of improvements in job training, preschool
education, preventive health and other programs
(Hovey 1999: 17-18). 
This lose-lose situation is very clear in most post-
communist transition countries: there are priorities
in the transformation processes, the pie to be distri-
buted is small indeed and it is largely current politics
– rather than explicitly formulated long-term
government policies – that determines how the pie is
cut. As Andrei Marga sadly remarked in a paper
about “reforming the postcommunist university”;
“politics and law, macroeconomics and finance, civil
rights and liberties, the church and the family, have
all been objects of consideration. But universities –
despite the vital roles they play in providing research
and expertise and in selecting and forming the lea-
ders of tomorrow – have not” (Marga 1997: 159). It
was no different for welfare policies in European
transition countries: Bob Deacon notes that “what
became immediately evident … was that debates of
any kind about social policy became relegated to
almost last place in the priority of many of the new
governments” (Deacon et al. 1997: 92). 
Higher education in CEE countries (as elsewhere)
has to compete with other forms of state spending,
and the costs of other forms of social needs are gro-
wing rapidly; the statistics concerning unemploy-
ment rates, access to public health care systems, the
level of funding accessible to the elderly through
existing pension schemes etc., are clear. And higher
education has not been competing successfully with
other programs over the last decade in most CEE
countries; it is enough to see the data on the general-
ly low (but still decent) public support for higher
education and very low and gradually decreasing
funding for research and development in many of
them (Poland in 2006 ranked the 29th among 30
OECD countries in terms of research funding, with
Mexico being the 30th). The American response to
the ever rising costs of all government-funded pro-
grams results from an awareness that there is basi-
cally no limit to potential consumer demand and thus
to government costs; “meeting all of the resulting
demand is impossible, so governments find ways to
limit consumption of what they produce” (Hovey
1999: 28)19. In the case of higher education though
(as well as the services of state schools, the police,
libraries etc), long tradition holds that it must be
offered to all citizens rather than to selected eligible
individuals. Consequently, public higher education
does not necessarily meet high standards of quality,
which drives more affluent or more ambitious
“users” into the arms of private sector providers.
What is guaranteed by the state is meeting minimum
standards. Higher education, to gain a bigger share
of government funds, would have to compete suc-
cessfully against other state-funded programs,
regardless of whether taxes are raised (a rather diffi-
cult, if not impossible option) or not20. As Giuliano
Bonoli and his colleagues put it in a European con-
text, “a basic premise of current welfare policy-
making is that taxes cannot be raised” (Bonoli et al.
2000: 72). The programs to compete with are social-
ly highly sensitive and in an American context inclu-
de education from birth through grade 12, programs
for the aged (with such major problems as the incre-
asing number of elderly people and the provision of
care for the aged), health care (with such major pro-
blems as rising costs and costs being shifted to the
government – e.g. 45 million people without health
insurance), programs for people on low incomes and
the safety net, and finally law enforcement. At the
same time none of these programs have any interest
in being associated with tax increases; the more sen-
sible position is to suggest that a given program be
funded by “giving it an appropriate priority in spen-
ding decisions” (Hovey 1999: 40). Allocating priori-
ty to different programs is a highly political issue in
every country; it does not seem to be any different in
Europe, or in CEE countries, for that matter21. The
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prospects in the future for increasing public funding
on public higher education, including public univer-
sities, are very low indeed; even documents from the
European Commission do not propose such actions
either for higher education or for research and deve-
lopment, suggesting instead, as in the case of the “3
percent” goal of national GDPs devoted to R&D
activities in EU Member countries by 2010, that pri-
vate funds contribute to reaching this goal22. 
Still another angle to view the future of higher edu-
cation in the context of the future of the welfare state
is to view it through what D. Bruce Johnstone has
called “diverging trajectories of costs and available
revenues”: which is a function of (1) per-student
costs, (2) increasing participation and (often) popu-
lation growth, and (3) increasingly inadequate
government revenue (shrinking tax base) (Johnstone
2007: 1). Viewed from this angle, higher education
in several major transition countries, Poland and
Romania included, have been consistently turning
towards privatisation, both external (new booming
private sector) and internal (fee-paying courses offe-
red in the public sector, providing often between 20
and 40 percent of revenues to the public universities,
see Kwiek 2007 a, 2007c). If we view privatisation
as a “process or tendency of universities taking on
characteristics of, or operational norms associated
with, private enterprises” (Johnstone 2007: 1), then
privatisation of higher education is in full swing in
many transition countries. Johnstone finds it useful
to look at privatisation as a direction along the con-
tinua of several related yet distinct dimensions: from
“high publicness” to “low privatness”, with 5 ele-
ments under consideration: mission or purpose,
ownership, source of revenue, control by govern-
ment, and norms of management (Johnstone 2007:
2). Certainly, the most difficult to analyze cases are
public universities (which are free for regular stu-
dents) and which charge fees from irregular weekend
students and whose revenues from fees can be as
high as 40 percent in Poland (or 90 percent in Mol-
dova and Russia, see EUEREK case studies availa-
ble from www.euerek.info).
4. Renegotiating the postwar
social contract? Welfare
state in transition
In more general terms, we are facing the simultane-
ous renegotiation of the postwar social contract con-
cerning the welfare state in Europe and the accom-
panying renegotiation of a smaller-scale, by compa-
rison, modern social pact between the university and
the nation-state (see Kwiek 2005 and 2006a)23.  The
renegotiation of the latter is not clear outside of the
context of the former, as state-funded higher educa-
tion formed one of the bedrocks of the European
welfare system. It is the overall argument that cur-
rent transformations to the state under the pressures
of globalization will not eventually leave the univer-
sity unaffected, and consequently it is useful to
discuss the university in the context of the current
global transformations of the state. The institution of
the university seems already to have found it legiti-
mate and necessary to evolve together with radical
transformations of its social setting. For in the new
global order, against the odds, universities are stri-
ving to maintain their traditionally pivotal role in
society. The role of universities as engines of econo-
mic growth, contributors to economic competitive-
ness and suppliers of well-trained workers for the
new knowledge-driven economy is being widely
acknowledged. But it is undoubtedly a radical refor-
mulation of the traditional social roles of the univer-
sity. The main reasons for these transformations of
the university include the globalization pressures on
nation-states and its public services, the end of the
“Golden age” of the Keynesian welfare state as we
have known it, and the emergence of knowledge-
based societies and knowledge-driven economies. 
More generally, the processes affecting the universi-
ty today are not any different from those affecting
the outside world; under both external pressures
(like globalization) and internal pressures (like chan-
ging demographics, the aging of societies, matura-
tion of welfare states, post-patriarchal family pat-
terns etc), the processes in question are the individu-
alization (and recommodification) of our societies
and the denationalization (and desocialization) of
our economies. On top of that, we are beginning to
feel at universities the full effects of the universali-
zation of higher education and the increasing com-
modification of research (Kwiek 2006a). 
Off-loading the state through increasing private
income for public universities and keeping the com-
petition between public and private providers in edu-
cation is a regional variation in CEE countries of the
global theme of privatisation in higher education.
We are witnessing the pressures of global forces on
both national policies with respect to the welfare
state and on national budgets accompanied by the
ideas (and ideals) of the “minimalist” – or, more
recently, “effective”, “intelligent” etc. – state with
smaller social duties than the West under post-war
welfare systems was familiar with. These pressures
are even more direct in CEE where the need for wel-
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fare services reforms may be (economically) more
urgent than in Western Europe. In the case of higher
education, the emergence of private providers fits
neatly into the picture. Other examples include
multi-pillar pension schemes being introduced in
many countries of the region and the (sometimes
partial) privatisation of healthcare services (see
Adeyi et al 1997, Berman 1998, Girouard and Imai
2000). We are witnessing more general attempts at a
reformulation of the post-war social contract which
gave rise to the welfare state in its various European
forms. In CEE, the social contract, including the
question which social benefits are available for citi-
zens (or more often, for working citizens) and which
are not, on what terms and conditions, needs to be
substantially re-written as the social setting provided
by communism does not exist any more. What made
a big difference between CEE and Western Europe
was the fact that communist “welfare state” (if it is
not a contradiction in terms) clearly assumed no dif-
ference between the social and the economic: the
economic role of most workplaces was smaller than
their welfare role (on the socialist welfare state, see
Wagener 2002: 154 ff). Today, this difference is
gone. And there is a growing private sector in higher
education in several transition countries, growing
private (or semi-privatized) healthcare sector, a well-
present private sector in pensions systems (both
mandatory second pillar and fully optional third pil-
lar in those countries where three pillar systems were
introduced), and growing number of private health
insurance available amidst generally declining
public healthcare institutions.
Many political scientists stress the idea that the eco-
nomic space of the nation-state and national territo-
rial borders no longer coincide. Good examples here
are such authors as Fritz Scharpf, director of the Max
Planck Institute for the Studies of Societies in Köln
or John G. Ruggie of Harvard University. Conse-
quently, the postwar “embedded liberalism compro-
mise” – the social contract between the state, market,
and labor – does not work anymore as it was desi-
gned to work within closed national economies.
Scharpf argues that in the history of capitalism, the
decades following the Second World War were
“unusual in the degree to which the boundaries of the
territorial state had become coextensive with the
boundaries of markets for capital, services, goods
and labor” (Scharpf 2000: 254). Investment opportu-
nities existed mainly within national economies and
firms were mainly challenged by domestic competi-
tors. At the time, however, when major European
welfare state regimes were being constructed, it was
not fully realized how much the success of market-
correcting policies depended on the capacity of the
territorial nation-states to control their economic
boundaries. Under the forces of globalization,
though, this controlling capacity was lost. “The ‘gol-
den years’ of the capitalist welfare state came to an
end” (Scharpf 2000: 255). The social contract which
had allowed the nation-states in advanced capitalist
countries to be accompanied by a welfare state ori-
ginated right after the Second World War. With the
advent of globalization, it is eroding, though, to dif-
ferent extent in different countries. The compact bet-
ween state and society in postwar Western European
territorially-bounded national democracies was
intended to mediate the deleterious domestic effects
of postwar economic liberalization. In postwar CEE
countries under communism, the fundamental
distinction between the social and the economic was
abolished; one of major post-1989 social shocks –
resulting often from different variants of “shock the-
rapies” – was the return to basics in welfare thinking
in which the distinction is crucial (Wagener 2002:
156, Sachs 1994: 267-269). The privatisation of the
educational sector in selected CEE countries – espe-
cially in its more evident variant of booming new
private institutions – fits nicely into the new picture
of smaller social responsibilities of the state, and
more individual responsibility of the individual for
his or her future (be it near future as in the case of
higher education, or more distant future as in the
case of more individualized, fully-funded pension
schemes being introduced regionally instead of the
traditional pay-as-you-go systems, see Taschowsky
2004, Guardiancich 2004). The individual comes
first; but also the individual, increasingly, pays first. 
This postwar compromise in Western Europe assig-
ned specific policy roles to national governments –
which governments are increasingly unable, or
unwilling, to perform today. One of the indirect
effects of globalization is its impact on the ability of
the state to “live up to its side of the postwar dome-
stic compact” (Ruggie 1997: 2). The emergence of
global capital markets posed entirely new policy
problems. The existing systems of supervision and
regulation, systems of taxation and accounting, were
created for a “nation-based world economic landsca-
pe” (Ruggie 1997: 2). Economic policies are beco-
ming increasingly denationalized and the state is
increasingly unable, or unwilling, to keep its promi-
ses from the Golden Age of the welfare state. And
the welfare state has traditionally been one of the
main pillars in the appeal of nation-state construc-
tion. 
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The power of the nation-state, and the power of the
loyalty of its citizens, has rested on a firm belief in
(historically unprecedented) welfare rights. When
the Keynesian welfare state was formed, the role of
the state was to find a fair balance between the state
and the market – which had fundamentally transfor-
med postwar social relations in all the countries
involved in this social experiment (and now we are
experiencing what Ulrich Beck called (in World Risk
Society) a “domino effect”: “Things which used to
supplement and reinforce one another in good times
– full employment, pension savings, high tax reve-
nue, leeway for government action – now tend muta-
tis mutandis to endanger one another”, Beck 1999:
11). The task of this postwar institutional reconstruc-
tion was to devise a framework which would safe-
guard and aid the quest for domestic stability
without triggering the mutually destructive external
consequences that had plagued the interwar period.
In the approach many political scientists, exempli-
fied here by Scharpf and Ruggie, the impact of glo-
balization on the nation-state is through undermining
the founding ideas behind the postwar welfare state:
through liberalization and the opening up of econo-
mies, nation-states begin to lose their legitimacy pro-
vided, in vast measure, by a social contract valid
only in closed, national economies. 
With the increasing speed of Europeanization, there
are new constraints on European welfare states,
especially those from the Eurozone. The advance of
economic integration in a recent decade has greatly
reduced the capacity of member states “to influence
the course of their own economies and to realize
self-defined sociopolitical goals”, as Scharpf claims
in his paper on the European social model (Scharpf
2002: 4). National monetary policies have been
replaced with ECB interest rates and there appeared
what he calls a “fundamental asymmetry” between
policies promoting market efficiencies and policies
promoting social protection and equality. Economic
policies became Europeanized while social protec-
tion policies stay at the national level. The rules of
the Internal Market and the Monetary Union, with its
Stability and Growth pact, leave national govern-
ments much less room for maneuver24. In transition
countries, especially in the 1990s, there was a strong
influence of the Washington Consensus institutions –
through political pressure and aid and loan conditio-
nalities (the distinction between “ideology”, “patro-
nage” and “best practices” being often blurred, see
for the Western Balkan countries Bateman, 2003;
Guardiancich 2004). Compared with Western Euro-
pean trends, some CEE countries have gone much
farther down the road of neoliberal reforms of –
especially – pension systems. The ideas derived
from the fundamental 1994 Averting the Old Age
Crisis World Bank book were subsequently imple-
mented in such diverse transition countries as
Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Slovakia, Macedonia, Romania, Ukraine and Uzbe-
kistan, in different variants. To date, 31 countries
have implemented some type of personal accounts as
part of their mandatory retirement income systems
(see Kritzer 2005). For most CEE countries, the
social security reform was not the priority in the first
wave of reforms; it was only in the second half of the
1990s that especially pension reforms became
unavoidable as the pay-as-you-go traditional
systems were consuming enormous percentage of
GDP (Poland establishing perhaps a world record in
1996 by spending 16 percent of its GDP on pensions,
see Holzmann 2004: 3). 
The economic stagnation which started in the second
half of the seventies in Europe was perhaps the first
symptom that the welfare system in the form desi-
gned for one period (the post-war reconstruction of
Europe) might be not be working in a different peri-
od25. The social conditions had changed considerab-
ly: the post-war social contract was related to an
industrial economy in a period of considerable
growth; the male bread-winner model of work was
changing; closed, national economies with largely
national competition for investment, goods, products
and services were becoming internationalized; the
marriage of the nation-state and the welfare-state
was under pressure, etc. The social agenda of the
eighties and nineties changed radically: after the
policies of the golden age of expansion, European
welfare states have been shaped by what Paul Pier-
son, a Harvard-based political scientist, termed poli-
tics of austerity (Pierson 2001a)26. 
And the social agenda in post-1989 CEE changed
even more radically: suddenly, the region was expo-
sed to new economic pressures, but also to new mar-
ket-oriented opportunities which in many cases
required better skills and higher competencies from
its citizens, provided by new, vocationally-focused
private institutions. While in Western Europe the
emergence of the private sector in education is both
marginal and often revolutionary (see the example of
Buckingham University in the UK, with a strong
Thatcherite ideological underpinning), in most CEE
countries it might be even considered as one of the
more realistic options available – in the situation of
the chronic underfunding of public institutions and,
in many instances, their structural inability to face
new challenges (with the huge social need to raise
Der Öffentliche Sektor - The Public Sector
Heft 3/2007 17
the enrollment levels at the forefront: to give a Polish
example: the number of students increased from
400,000 in 1990 to almost 2,000,000 in 2006, about
33 percent of which are enrolled in 317 private insti-
tutions. The capacities of the public sector has not
changed dramatically in the period: both the number
of faculty and educational premises available have
been at roughly the same level. New students used
the avenues available to them through the process of
privatisation: they either entered fee-paying part-
time studies in the public sector or fee-paying stu-
dies in the emergent private sector. Relatively liberal
legislation regarding the private sector, accompanied
by genuine interest of the public sector faculty in
both running fee-paying weekend studies and crea-
ting out of scratch the private sector made possible
this impressive transformation of Polish higher edu-
cation). 
Seeing higher education policies in isolation from
larger welfare state policies would be assuming a
short-sighted perspective: higher education is a sig-
nificant (and often significantly fund-consuming)
part of the public sector and a part of the traditional
welfare state that is right now under severe pressu-
res, even though they may not be as strong as pres-
sures on the two main parts of it, healthcare and pen-
sions. In more theoretical than practical terms, these
phenomena had their powerful impact on thinking
about public services, including public higher educa-
tion, in CEE. The theoretical impact was already
translated into changed national legislation in the
case of the pensions reform and health care reforms
at the end of 1990s27. 
5. Conclusions
The future of the welfare state in its traditional Euro-
pean forms, and of its services, including public hig-
her education, looks roughly similar all over Europe
(exceptions include such small countries of advan-
ced information economies as e.g. Finland, see
Castells and Himanen 2002). Unfortunately, most
lines of argumentation point in the same direction,
even though the concepts used may be different. The
story gets even more homogenous if we leave the
domain of affluent Western democracies which have
inherited their welfare provisions from the “Golden
age” and pass on to most developing countries and
the European transition countries. In this new con-
text, many discussions about welfare futures seem
academic: what they shyly predict for affluent demo-
cracies is in fact already happening in transition eco-
nomies; happening in full swing, with almost no
other policy options being considered; sometimes
with no other options being supported, championed
or acclaimed by these very same affluent democra-
cies. There is certainly a lot of social experimenta-
tion with respect to welfare going on in the transition
countries. It could even be argued that the future
directions of welfare transformations in Western
democracies are being experimented with to various
degrees of success in transition countries; in some
areas, like pensions reform with the three-pillar
model designed by the World Bank and applied in
some Latin American and European transition coun-
tries, this intention even happens to be formulated
explicitly. Nowadays, as the reduction of the welfa-
re state in general progresses smoothly (and mostly
in an unnoticeable manner e.g. through new legisla-
tion) in most parts of the world, social contracts with
regards to most areas of state benefits and state-fun-
ded services may have to be renegotiated, signifi-
cantly changing their content. In many respects, hig-
her education (in transition countries and elsewhere)
seems to be an experimental area and a testing
ground on how to reform the public sector in many
countries and for many organizations; both higher
education, healthcare and pensions systems are
being experimented with, both in theory and in prac-
tice28. The end-products of these experimentations
are still largely hard to predict. 
1) Paper presented at the seminar “Geographies of Knowledge,
Geometries of Power: Higher Education in the 21st Century”,
Gregynog, University of Wales, January 18, 2006, at the invi-
tation of Rosemary Deem, and, reworked, at the PRESOM
(Privatisation and the European Social Model) seminar at
Berlin School of Economics, October 6, 2007, at the invita-
tion of Wolfgang Blaas.
2) Although it has to be remembered that, as Martin Carnoy put
it, “objective data in the economic, demographic and social
spheres have greater or lesser impact as focus for welfare
retrenchment according to the way they are politically inter-
preted and accepted in the country’s policy-making process”
(Carnoy 1999: 153).
3) In his 2001 report to the Belgian Presidency of the European
Union (A New Welfare Architecture for Europe?), Esping-
Andersen argues that vocational training and increased parti-
cipation in higher education are unlikely, by themselves, to
solve the problems caused by a fall in the demand for low
skill labour: “If fighting social exclusion through employ-
ment remains the principal policy goal of the European soci-
al model in the early 21st century, the learning offensive will
have to be complemented with strategies of raising employ-
ment opportunities for low skill workers through other
means” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2001: 230).
4) Let us remember here an interesting distinction drawn in a
European Commission communication on Investing Effi-
ciently in Education and Training between the “knowledge
rich” and the “knowledge poor”. As the document argues,
“with an increasing premium on skills, the polarisation bet-
ween the knowledge rich and the knowledge poor puts strains
on economic and social cohesion. … An important challenge
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is to develop education and training throughout life in such a
way that change and restructuring in the economy have no
adverse effects on social cohesion” (EC 2003a: 8).
5) Such a desirable policy mix is defined by Ferrera, Hemerijck
and Rhodes in “The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work
and Welfare in the New Economy” in the following way: “a
robust macroeconomic policy; wage moderation and flexibi-
lity (achieved where possible within broader ‘social pacts’);
employment-friendly and efficient tax social policy; labour
market ‘flexicurity’ [secured flexible employment]; and new
methods of tackling poverty and social exclusion” (Ferrera et
al 2001: 115). 
6) Thinking of the emergent European Research Area, let us
remember briefly the European Commission’s views: “it is
very important to realise that the largest share of this deficit
stems from the low level of private investment in higher edu-
cation and research and development in the EU compared
with the USA. At the same time, private returns on invest-
ment in tertiary education remain high in most EU countries”.
Consequently, the thesis of the communication on Investing
Efficiently in Education and Training: an Imperative for
Europe is that “faced with relatively low private investment
levels and high private returns on university education, the
main responsibility of authorities is not only to continue to
provide higher education institutions and students with a suf-
ficient level of public funding, but also to find ways to add to
it by increasing and diversifying private investment in higher
education”. What is needed is therefore a “combination of
targeted public investments and higher private contributions”
(EC 2003a: 13, 15, emphasis mine). What is even more sig-
nificant, is EC’s recent shift in thinking about students fees,
until 2006 clearly excluded, today viewed as a possibility to
be reconsidered by national governments.
7) Formally speaking, the European Social Model has not been
defined as such in any single place. The Treaty of Amsterdam
in 1997 includes a Social Chapter, and the “Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union” adopted at Nice in
2000 includes an important chapter on “Solidarity”. It is evi-
dent that in practice the acquis communautaire of the EU
does not include the social acquis, though. See especially
Ferge 2001a, 2001b. 
8) In CEE countries, in general terms, there is no social contract
to renegotiate and welfare provisions need to be defined from
the very beginning. Consequently, while the dismantling of
the welfare state, especially with strong democratic electoral
structures and powerful civil society groups, might not occur
in the near future in Western Europe, the process might be
long-term so that eased by social protection measures, an
already “dismantled” welfare state may be built along neoli-
beral lines in CEE countries without actually renegotiating
the postwar European social contract – which was absent
there. Ideologically, there is an important difference between
the potential dismantling of the welfare state (in Western
Europe) and the actual dismantling of the remnants of bure-
aucratic welfare from the ancient regime (in Central and
Eastern Europe). It is extremely interesting to draw parallels
between Paul Pierson’s (1994) description of welfare state
retrenchment in the United Kingdom and the US (in the times
of Reagan and Thatcher) and the ongoing welfare reforms in
selected countries of the CEE (Poland being a natural and
well-researched candidate). Christiane Lemke seems to have
been wrong when stating that the applicant countries had to
adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, “including the
social acquis”, as well as that the idea of European-wide soci-
al standards “gained a higher profile” (Lemke 2001: 14).
Unfortunately, the European social acquis, from the perspec-
tive of one year after Enlargement, seems unattainable. 
9) Ferge finds the neoliberal tendency dominant in CEE coun-
tries. It is “practically ubiquitous” and “seems to be dictated
by concerns allegedly related to globalization pressures. Its
hallmarks are the will to deregulate all markets, the labour
market included; the drive to lower direct and indirect labour
costs; and the privatisation and marketization of former
public goods and services resulting in a smaller state. These
endeavors are underpinned by a forceful rhetoric about the
need to end ‘state paternalism’, and to strengthen self relian-
ce and self-provision” (Ferge 2001a: 129-30). 
10) Peter Evans in his paper on “The Eclipse of the State? Reflec-
tions on Stateness in an Era of Globalization” (1997) also
refers to the hypothesis of “the return of the ideological pen-
dulum” but emphasizes that it need not sanction a return to
the past and that it can be easily conflated with a return to
“embedded liberalism”: “States took on more than they could
handle during the period following World War II. Dealing
with the capacity gap clearly required rethinking the state’s
role. Readjustment was necessary, and overzealousness in
reducing the state’s role, natural. The return of the pendulum
need not sanction a return to the past, but it would legitimate
new efforts to turn states into effective instruments for the
achievement of collective goals” (Evans 1997: 83). 
11) The implementation of both sets of policies was accompanied
by the introduction of a new set of terms and expressions such
as e.g. downsizing or rightsizing; lean and mean; contracting
out, off-loading or outsourcing; steering rather than rowing;
empowering rather than serving; earning rather than spen-
ding; such slogans as “let managers manage” or “manage-
ment is management” etc. The idea was to see no difference
between the manner in which public affairs and private enter-
prise ought to be run – to conduct public affairs, as far as pos-
sible, on business principles (United Nations 2001: 38). 
12) With respect to both the UK and USA, it is useful to see how
Paul Pierson conceptualizes the processes of welfare state
retrenchment in his Dismantling the Welfare State? (1994),
though without much reference to the education sector; for
the developments in the education sector, see e.g. Sally Tom-
linson’s Education in a Post-welfare Society (2001). 
13) It is still unclear to what extent structural adjustment policies,
programs and conditionalities are still imposed in their most
rigid forms by the IMF in the developing world (the work of
the World Bank is closely tied to that of the IMF – without the
endorsement of the Fund it is not possible to enter into nego-
tiations with the Bank, as Carlos Alberto Torres reminds us in
his paper on “The State, Privatisation and Educational Policy:
a Critique of Neo-Liberalism in Latin America and Some
Ethical and Political Implications” (Torres 2002: 374). 
14) As already mentioned, the role of government in producing
and distributing goods and services must “shrink dramatical-
ly”, it must mostly “facilitate private activity”, and what is
needed in most general terms is a “wholesale reinvention of
government” (World Bank 1996: 110ff). 
15 The picture is clear, as are the recommendations that can be
drawn from it, especially for developing countries: “[t]here is
a growing recognition that in many countries monopoly
public providers of infrastructure, social services, and other
goods and services are unlikely to do a good job. … It is now
well established that the state can help households to cope
with certain risks to their economic security. … But the idea
that the state alone must carry this burden is changing. …
Innovative solutions that involve businesses, labor, house-
holds, and community groups are needed to achieve greater
security at lower cost” (World Bank 1997: 4-5). 
16) The “end-of-history” mood captured by Francis Fukuyama in
his The End of History with respect to the public sector has
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been summarized by some commentators in the following
manner: “The collapse of Eastern European regimes … has
fostered a wider disillusion with all publicly owned and fun-
ded institutions. Any public organization, whatever social
benefit it aims to provide, is for the moment tarred with the
brush of intervention in the free market environment. There is
a quiet suspicion that all such institutions are somehow doo-
med, or at least doomed not to be successful” (Smith and
Webster 1998: 5, emphasis mine). To give a local example:
the initial enthusiasm with which private higher education
institutions were being opened at the beginning of the 1990s
in several Central and East European countries (most notably
in Poland, Romania and Estonia) was accompanied by the
motive to follow new (academic and economic) paths, inde-
pendent of (any) state interventionism. 
17) As Cerny argues, globalization leads to a “growing disjunc-
tion between the democratic, constitutional and social aspira-
tions of people – which continue to be shaped by and under-
stood through the framework of the territorial state – and the
increasingly problematic potential for collective action
through the state political process” (Cerny 1995: 618). We are
especially concerned here with those “social” aspirations
which include all the services and benefits characteristic of
the (Bob Jessop’s) “Keynesian National Welfare State” (cer-
tainly including higher education). 
18) Especially that, as Zsuzsa Ferge and others show, “the EU
suggestions for some reforms of social security may steer
these countries in a more American than European direction”
(Ferge 2001b: 1). Based on a careful reading of the Accession
Reports from the Community to the ten applicant countries,
Ferge finds a “hidden policy agenda” there: “the Union has a
different social security agenda for the accession countries
than for the EU members. … there seems to be a hidden agen-
da for the applicant countries not quite in line either with the
European model or with the subsidiarity principle. The hid-
den agenda suggests to the accession countries measures con-
trary to the European model, such as the privatisation of pen-
sions and health, or the cutback of already low social expen-
ditures” (Ferge 2001b: 1, emphases mine). Her conclusions
are clear-cut: “The implicit model for Central Eastern Europe
which in many cases is dutifully applied is different from the
European model as we knew it, and close in many respects to
the original World Bank agenda. As a matter of fact high offi-
cials of the Bank do present the developments in Central-
Eastern Europe as a social policy model to be followed by the
current members of the Union” (Ferge 2001b: 12, emphasis
mine). 
19) The major difference from the redistributive side of govern-
ment policies between Europe and the US is that European
governments redistribute income among their citizens on a
much larger scale; European social programs are much more
generous and European tax systems are more progressive.
While European countries provide more public welfare than
the United States, Americans engage in more private provi-
sion of welfare (e.g. charity) than Europeans do (see Alesina
et al. 2001). 
20) “Tax competition” in more or less disguised forms seems
unavoidable in the increasingly open economies in which
there are less and less protective trade barriers. Globalization
will make it increasingly difficult for countries to have tax
levels that are substantially above those countries with which
they compete (see Camdessus 1998). 
21) One thing is certain, though: “There is complete agreement
among researchers studying the post-socialist transition that
one key task ahead is radical reform of the pension system,
health care, provision for children and the aged, social assi-
stance, and the other spheres of the welfare system”, as János
Kornai put it (1997: 339). 
22) Consequently, the European Commission states that “the
resources and policies that need to be mobilised encompass
much more than government R&D spending. Indeed, more
than 80% of the R&D investment gap with the United States
lies in the funding levels of the business sector”. The main
challenge for inducing higher private investment in the R&D
sector is to make it “more attractive and profitable” (EC
2002: 5). 
23) Some passages in this section has been adapted from my
paper “The University and the State in a Global Age: renego-
tiating the traditional social contract?”, European Educational
Research Journal, vol. 4, no. 4 (December 2005). 
24) Currently, a single European social model seems unthinkable
as welfare state models correspond to different social philo-
sophies which produced different (three) “worlds of welfare
capitalism”, in Esping-Andersen’s formulation (1990).
Scharpf makes an excellent point about the European diversi-
ty of welfare states: “citizens in all countries have come to
base their life plans on the continuation of existing systems of
social protection and taxation and would, for that reason
alone, resists major structural changes. Voters in Britain sim-
ply could not accept the high levels of taxation that sustain
the generous Swedish welfare state; Swedish families could
not live with the low level of social and educational services
provided in Germany; and German doctors and patients
would unite in protest against any moves toward a British-
style National Health System” (Scharpf 2002: 7-8). For
World Bank ideas how to achieve a “European” pension
system, see Holzmann (2004). 
25) As Gøsta Esping-Andersen put it in “A Welfare State for the
21st Century”, “most European social protection systems
were constructed in an era with a very different distribution
and intensity of risks and needs than exist today. … As a con-
sequence, the welfare state is burdened with responsibilities
for which it was not designed” (Esping-Andersen 2001,
emphasis mine). 
26) Consequently, the rhetoric of a “crisis” in the welfare state
has been with us since the 1970s. There was also a growing
interest in non-state welfare providers. The OECD report,
The Welfare State in Crisis, had already stated in 1981 that
“new relationships between action by the state and private
action must be thought; new agents for welfare and well-
being developed; the responsibilities of individuals for them-
selves and others reinforced” (OECD 1981: 12). 
27) There is also one more reservation that needs to be taken
here: if we take into account the distinction between state
welfare and private welfare, we are focusing in this paper on
the former Keynesian i.e. state variant of welfare. This is a
crucial point because, as Giuliano Bonoli, Vic George and
Peter Taylor-Gooby remarked in passing, without actually
developing the idea, “while globalization had a constraining
effect on state welfare, it had an expansive effect on private
welfare. The net result may have been that though the total
volume of welfare may have been unaffected, a greater pro-
portion of that is taken up by private welfare provision. All
the available evidence shows a country’s ranking on total
welfare effort can differ from that of its state welfare sector”,
as e.g. in the USA (Bonoli et al. 2000: 69, emphases mine).
But private welfare is based on market mechanisms – while
in the traditional Esping-Andersen description of welfare in
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism the crucial point is
“maintaining a livelihood without reliance on the market”
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 22). 
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28) The biggest empirical evidence for the direction of changes in
the transformation of the public sector are various “structural
adjustment” programs in developing and transition countries
which require the states taking IMF or World Bank loans to
e.g. reduce public expenditures, reduce consumer subsidies,
eliminate price controls, drastically reduce tariffs, charge
users for public services and privatize public enterprises and
social services, see Carnoy 1999: 49, Ferge 2001. 
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